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Trouble with Images in Computational
Physics*,
Ma Spencer
Over 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork with a group of
computational physicists, I encountered many negative assessments
of the part that images should play in the accomplishment of good
research. In this essay I explore the question of where these anxieties
might come from and what they mean. Using Bachelard’s philosophy,
I first point to the role that the image plays in conditioning the
imagination and in training intuitive judgement. But to get to the
boom of the trouble with images we are led through Rheinberger and
Stiegler to a view of scientific cognition that extends beyond the mind
to prosthetic circuits of artefacts, including both images and wrien
inscriptions. Rather than locating the problem as one of the relation
between the image and what it represents, I argue for the importance of
general cultural difficulties in managing and manipulating artefactual
assemblages.
“Images lie,” says one scientist. “It is much beer to work with numbers.” A
colleague of hers commented that “there is a substantial percentage of scientists,
maybe even 10 percent, who will see a prey picture and just want to use it,
without even knowing how it is validated. I think that is just disturbing.” More
strong language from a third source: “I think prey pictures are an uer waste
of time” and a fourth: “Images tell you nothing.”1
This trope—“representation gone bad”—is hardly something new. It has long
been part of our Western heritage (Latour and Weibel 2002). From Plato’s
expulsion of the artists from the Republic to the history of smashed idols,
representations embody an entrenched antagonism between the authentic and
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the derivative. In charting the recent history of simulation methods across
the sciences, Sherry Turkle (2009, 5, 31, 76–81) shows that computer-generated
images emerge as a key locus for anxieties about the legitimacy of these new
ways of conducting research. I want to use this focussed discussion to briefly
explore the background of these kinds of concerns, which were oen voiced in
the 32 interviews that I conducted with computational scientists at all stages of
their careers. These interviews were one element of an 18 month ethnographic
study of a London-based computational physics research group (the Imperial
College Applied Modelling and Computation Group).
The anxieties evident in the fragments quoted above stand at odds with
the plethora of images created in the course of these scientists’ own everyday
research. If images are so troublesome, why keep on creating them? My
informants work in the fields of geophysical and computational fluid dynamics,
using simulations to study engineering, oceanographic, atmospheric, and
geological problems. Despite negative assessments, it is undeniable that images
play a key role in conducting this research. Most importantly, they provide
ways of working with data, a rough and ready “shortcut” to understanding data
generated by simulations for which diagnostics have yet to be developed. In each
case, it takes time to figure out whether the simulation is doing what you think it
is doing, whether what it is doing is the right thing to be doing, and whether it is
doing it for the right reasons. It can take a while to develop statistical measures
tailored to the specific problem and to implement methods to condense the
output data into a variable or set of variables appropriate for validation. In the
meantime,many simulations are producing datasets too big to be directly “read.”
So despite reservations about the eventual value of images, visualisation remains
an indispensable technique within the intermediate stages of the investigative
process, particularly when the model is in the process of being created.2
Images circulate in the laboratory as tools aiding the ongoing flow of
research. They are equally objects of fascination and delight. Fluid dynamics
research produces some wonderful images of swirling vortices, something that
many ofmy informants are openly proud of. Occasional emails circulate through
the group’s communication channels calling for the collection ofmembers’ latest
and best images for use on the website or on posters showing off the group’s
work. Such images abound in the fluid dynamics literature, adorning websites
and textbooks and play no small role in defining the public perceptions of what
fluid dynamics is.
We gain a handle on the contrast between the positive and the negative
assessments of images quoted at the beginning of this paper if we note that
2 See, for example, M. Monteiro, Reconfiguring evidence: Interacting with digital objects
in scientific practice, Computer Supported Cooperative Work 9(3-4) (2010): 335–354; and
M. Spencer, Image and practice: Visualisation in computational fluid dynamics research,
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 37(1) (2012): 86–100.
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the laer valuations are all strongly associated with epistemic concerns about
persuasion and the legitimacy of arguments. Such concerns rarely referred
to codified rules, having more to do with the virtues of conducting oneself
appropriately in debate and in writing, the activities which involve presenting
research results to a wider (academic, industrial-professional and, occasionally,
lay public) audience.
It is necessary to stress that in their criticisms of images, my informants had
in mind visualisations of complex domains. They never wanted to extend their
criticisms to graphs due to the relatively unambiguous conventional procedures
to convert a graph into a table of numbers. In contrast, the visualisations that
produce the “prey pictures” of which they speak only provide a qualitative
understanding, and it is much harder to control exactly how such qualitative
understandings can support an argument.
It was not, however, because images fail to provide epistemic support
that they are regarded as problematic. Many other aspects of any research
publication will similarly lack epistemic merit (the snappy title, the font it is
printed in, the acknowledgements). It is not because images fail to convince
a reader, but because, through a potential akin to pure rhetoric, they can end
up being convincing in the wrong way. A beautiful image can be compelling
in and of itself, quite aside from whether the simulation that produced it was
set up right and quite aside from what specific claims are being argued. My
informants were wary not because images fail to convince a reader. Indeed, they
generally felt that an image should fail to convince a reader. The wariness arises
from the possibility that the images they used might convince their reader of
the entirely wrong things for entirely the wrong reasons. The third source, quoted
above, went on to contrast the persuasive power of images with that of statistical
validation of the model. It is the laer, he felt, that should be the proper locus
for persuasion. Several others echoed this sentiment with a much more general
contrast between the relative merits of images and “hard numbers.”
So how can we account for the coincidence of utility and danger in the
image?
For the French epistemologist Gaston Bachelard, scientists must always be
wary of images. If science is to progress, it is necessary that scientists disrupt
their imaginative faculties, that they find ways to kick the feet out from under
intuitive ways of thinking that have been cultivated across the many arenas of
daily life. It is essential for modern science, in Bachelard’s view, to overcome
what he calls “epistemological obstacles” (Bachelard 2002, 24). Past experience
has provided us with images through which wemake sense of the world, some of
which yield false certainties so entrenched that only great efforts will see them
shied. Thus Bachelard would assert that “[a] science that accepts images is,
more than any other, a victim of metaphor” (Bachelard 2002, 47).
Substance is one of Bachelard’s examples. He writes of the manner in which
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images of interiority and inwardness exerted an influence on the ways in which
scientific phenomena have been analysed. These imaged forms of thought are
more thanways of speaking: “there is in fact more here than just description by a
word: there is explanation by a thought. You think as you see and you think what
you see: a speck of dust sticks to an electrified surface and therefore electricity is
a glue, a very sticky glue” (Bachelard 2002, 109). Inspired by the challenges posed
by relativity and quantum theory to the necessity that Kant supposed governed
intuition, Bachelard’s “non-Kantian” theory of science is based on its continual
overturning of entrenched certainties (Bachelard 1968). Science, therefore, works
with, upon, but most importantly, against, the image.
The imagination in Bachelard’s view wanders among tropes laid down over
a lifetime, especially during childhood, expressed particularly vividly in poetry
and in dreams. These intuitions are in constant interactionwith new experiences.
Paerns in fluid dynamics images (see Figure 1) recall the ways in which we
dwell among fluids, in which we bathe and consume them, the ways we paddle,
pour, stir, soak, and splash. Certain kinds of images are favoured, as are certain
scales, which are conditioned by the bodies and environments we inhabit. As
Myers (2006) has shown, far from being disembodied, computational science
is profoundly affected by “body-work,” and scientists engage with phenomena
through a whole range of bodily and gestural entanglements. With Bachelard
we can add to this a tension, an ambivalence of such affective processes;
while images open certain paths of investigation they may equally constitute
a blockage of others.
Figure 1. Imperial College Applied Modelling and Computation Group. Visualisation of data
generated by a simulation of the generation of internal waves, and their breaking, in stratified
flow over a bump
My informants regarded their intuitions as a key resource for judging
the success of their manipulations of computer code. Notoriously fragile, the
meaning and effect of soware may be radically altered with a single character
out of place. Some errors in seing up a simulation will effectively simulate the
wrong fluid. Manymore will totally disturb any supposed connection with fluids
whatsoever.
If the image evokes intuitions of fluids, oen in this context a moving image,
it serves as a rough, provisional indication that the project remains on the right
lines. This informal kind of check is thus ubiquitous in the laboratory routine.
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One scientist put it like this:
Would you expect that if you bent a piece of wood into a certain
position, and then bent it further, it snaps? If it keeps bending and
bending and didn’t snap you would say that is unphysical. I guess
you could say the same of fluid dynamics. There are just some things
that the system just isn’t supposed to do.
On several fronts, fluids exceed codified knowledge of what they do. Turbulence,
one of the central phenomena of fluid dynamics, implies for modellers that there
are dynamics going on at scales smaller than those which they explicitly model.
One scientist interview put it enigmatically: “I think one of the best ways to put
it is that turbulence is that thing that you can’t ever model.” There are always
phenomena that escape the model, and thus no absolute or “mechanical” means
for recognising a fluid to serve as a yardstick against the fallibility of intuition.
Being produced as part of the accomplishment of research while feeding
back into its ongoing concerns, images are among the many inscriptions that
form the material culture in which research is carried out. But I here want to
side with Rheinberger (1997, 106) in making the claim that their importance is to
be judged “not by what they depict, but by how they work. Immutable mobiles
[a term from Latour] fix transient events (make them durable), and in doing
so, allow them to be moved in space and time (make them available in many
places). That is their power.” Rather than keeping with Bachelard in analysing
the perception of a singular image, Rheinberger points us towards the many
images of the laboratory, and how they connect with themany other inscriptions
(text, data, code) found across its domain.
Digital images in computational science emerge out of work with
visualisation soware, explorations of the vast possibilities for scientists seeing
what they have done when making and running simulations. This work,
choosing colours, variables to display, contrasts to highlight, viewing angles, is
just the start. Any thus created image can be manipulated and explored, and
while easily discarded, it can also be rendered mobile, exported, saved, now
embodied in a standard format data-file. It can travel and multiply, across many
screens, projectors and printmedia. It can facilitate decisions elsewhere, catalyse
discussions, act as a heuristic, and be embedded in new sites of narrative,
contrast, and series.
To talk of representation is to talk of a shiing assembly of related traces:
“material signs, entities of signification” (Rheinberger 1997, 111; cf. Derrida
1974). The image in Figure 1 is one such trace. It represents internal waves in
stratified flow and emerges from a project investigating the physical processes
at work in “real world” sea loch systems. But it also represents the data-set
that is embodied in its contours and colours (blue standing for fresh water, red
for salty, and yellow and green for in-between). ite aside from any empirical
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target, the image is a way to display this data set, an aempt to render visible
what is embodied there. Furthermore, any such generated traces are indexical
of the soware that produced them and the “model” it embodies. Not confined
to a singular motive of studying a sea loch, the research project is also equally
concerned with validating the larger soware framework, demonstrating that to
some degree it should be judged capable of simulating turbulence in stratified
flows, a key stepping stone towards simulating many other fluid phenomena.
The code itself is further connected with other bodies of soware and theory.
Rheinberger’s approach stresses the dynamics of interaction and substitution
among a flat array of relations, and he is therefore “not concerned… with
the relation between theory and reality, between concept and object as such”
(Rheinberger 1997, 104). Instead, he is “concerned with describing the process
of making science as a process in which traces are generated, displaced, and
superposed” (Rheinberger 1997, 105). This point of view stands in stark contrast
to the general tendency in the philosophy of representation to isolate a single
relation and ask of it alone what it does and how it does it.
What Rheinberger describes is a wide field of play, of many images, and
many other traces, connected in many ways and involved in a dynamic process
of articulation. Looking beyond the images of the imagination described by
Bachelard, we also need to appreciate them as cognitively significant things in
the world. As Heidegger argued, it may be more appropriate to regard cognition
as a worldly practice, rather than as something locked awaywithin the enclosure
of a subject: “the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning
with one’s booty to the ’cabinet’ of consciousness aer one has gone out and
grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, theDaseinwhich knows
remains outside, and it does so as Dasein” (Heidegger 1978, 89). Beyond their
capacity to provoke intuitive responses from a viewer, images can also be seen as
artefactual strata that embody in themselves something of the cognitive circuits
that comprise the scientists’ systems of exploration. They are not just technical
but “mnemotechnical” in the terms of the philosopher Bernard Stiegler, systems
of externalised memory (Stiegler 2008).
Both Rheinberger and Stiegler draw inspiration from the writings of Jacques
Derrida. He regards the kind of ambivalence expressed by my informants
as a general symptom consequent of all processes of working with and
through externalisations. This ambivalence is traced to the “very condition
of systematicity or seriality in general” (Derrida 2004, 106). As external
artefacts, inscriptions can be “generated, displaced, and superposed,” material
manipulations which facilitate the grasp of their complex inter-relatedness. But
in the same movement the author relinquishes control of what is embodied
there. Just like Bachelard, therefore, Stiegler offers a normative stance on
images as instances of externalisation. Technical systems materialise knowledge
and thus render it workable for all sorts of new kinds of “distributed
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cognition” (Hutchins 1995), but they equally always harbour the potentiality
to “short-circuit” knowledge (Stiegler 2010, 35), blocking access to certain parts
of the network.
In the opinions of my informants, the image poses an obstacle, a) when
it convinces through aesthetic compulsion; and b) when it is therefore taken
“out of context.” The proper context is one in which the intrinsic limitations of
the simulation that generated the image are known. What represents and how
it represents, we are told by a wave of contemporary philosophers, depends
on the context (Suárez 2010; van Fraassen 2008; Giere 2004). But the thing
about inscriptions is that they can travel. Images travel beyond the site of
their generation, and along the way there is the possibility of sloughing off
accompanying contextual markers, with a variety of legitimacy-bolstering or
undermining effects (Lahsen 2005). These markers are put down in wrien form
in order that theymay entwine the travelling image in amnemotechnical circuit,
enveloping it with traces of its origin. In publication, it is epistemically virtuous
to mark the narrative with caveats, largely consequences of the idealisations
through which the simulation was made. “Some models,” said one informant,
“simply can’t answer the question you want to ask.” But whether or not
you can tell if a given model can answer your question depends on what
has accompanied it on its travels. Obviously given the Sisyphean nature of
aempting to “give” the whole context (where could you possibly draw the
line?), the question is one of judging the merits of the fragments that remain.
Science, like many human activities, occurs among technical systems. But
any externalisation has its independence, what oen seems an animistic “life
of its own.” It cannot be fully controlled, even by those with the strongest
claims to authorship. The problem for images, as expressed by my informants,
is a problem of control which relates to the materiality of the systems they
create, manipulate, and eventually render partially independent. Images are
accompanied by a web of other inscriptions that embody the much less tangible
relations between the image and its site of production. It is the relation
between the image and these other inscriptions that constitutes the risk of the
short-circuit, and the point at which any configuration stands to be judged as
good or bad. This relation is too oen eclipsed in the second-order accounts
of social scientists and philosophers by another relation, its more assertive
neighbour, that between the simulation and the reality it simulates, which under
the name of validation is the focus for a huge amount of concern and practical
labour.
There is no reason to expect that this kind of problem will be confined to
computational science. Anxieties about representation inmany different spheres
have crystallised around images (Maurer 2006). But the novelty of computational
methods and the disturbance they pose to established forms of science raises
questions about legitimacy with particular force, and images in this field find
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themselves the outlet for much wider concerns for those whose agency and
identity are bound up in these pursuits.
The robustness of the travelling image stands in contrast to the fragility of its
relations to the traces of its context, the explanations of its origins in a particular
time and place, a particular research project, a model with a history and specific
limits. Despite all the scientists’ best efforts, this contrast cannot be overcome.
The textual accompaniment is always at risk of being insufficiently explained or
just wrien badly or wrongly. “You can’t write it all down in your paper,” says
one interviewee, “and even if you do, youmight get it wrong. There are examples
where someone has wrien a paper and has got something wrong in their
description of what they did, and when you go and look at the original source
code, they actually did it right.” There is always a risk of being skimmed over,
skipped, ignored, misinterpreted, mistranslated, lost, or forgoen. Or maybe the
image is just too compelling.
In my aempt to interpret the scientists’ complaints, therefore, the key issue
becomes not the image as such. Nor is it the context for visual representation.
It is the material-cognitive interrelations between visual inscriptions and the
markers of their context, as these wind their way through the networks of
scientific culture. Such worries about images are more than a local expression
of the troubles with representation. For we should not accept the assumption
that the natural state of culture is stasis and coherence, but open our eyes to
human agency among the exigencies of symbolic decomposition (Wagner 1981).
These scientific troubles would then instantiate in a microcosm the feats and
frustrations of assembling culture, working against the broadest tendencies of
things to fall apart.
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